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In the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001,
four or five letters containing spores of Bacillus
anthracis were sent to media companies and poli-
ticians in various parts of the USA. As a result, 11
persons contracted pulmonary anthrax, and
another seven the cutaneous form of the infection.
Five of those with pulmonary anthrax died. All of
the letters were sent from Trenton, New Jersey,
and it seems likely that the same person is respon-
sible for all of them. So far, information about the
B. anthracis strain has been sparse, but it seems
likely that it is of American origin. Furthermore,
there are (when this was written in mid-December
2001) no indications that the terrorists who exe-
cuted the airplane attack are also behind the
anthrax incidents. In fact, it not unlikely that the
anthrax attack is not bioterrorism but rather a
criminal act by a single person.
Irrespective of whether the anthrax attack was
bioterrorism, several lessons have been learned.
First, it seems clear that it is relatively easy to
produce contagious material, which can be spread
by various techniques. However, it is important to
realize that a preparation of anthrax spores that
can be spread by aerosol is not easy to manufac-
ture. The spores must be prepared as particles
which float in the air. This requires sophisticated
techniques. It is therefore not unlikely that the
anthrax preparation used in the US attack origi-
nated in a laboratory with considerable technical
resources. If someone wants access to less sophis-
ticated preparations of anthrax, it is easy to find the
organisms, since the infection is endemic in both
cattle and humans in most parts of the world.
The second lesson is that, even with limited
effects in terms of number of persons infected,
an attack like the anthrax one has very consider-
able effects on society. Thus, in all countries in the
world, a copycat phenomenon, with large num-
bers of letters and packages claiming to contain
contagious material, had profound consequences.
The laboratories dealing with these samples were
faced with hitherto unknown problems, e.g. the
decision of how to handle powders of different
kinds. The most profound effects were on the
persons and organizations handling or receiving
the packages or letters. Several postal services,
government departments and other organizations
were closed for long periods while awaiting test
results. Another serious problem was the use of
prophylactic antibiotics. Based on experience of an
anthrax emergency in Sverdlovsk some years ago,
in which the incubation period for one patient was
48 days, the US recommendation was to use pro-
phylactic antibiotics for 60 days, a very long time
indeed.
The third lesson was that in no country was
there full preparedness for what happened. It took
time to mobilize laboratories and other organiza-
tions. Supplies of antibiotics were not always suf-
ficient to guarantee prophylaxis and/or treatment
for a large number of exposed individuals. This
problem was further aggravated by the lack of
information about the US anthrax strain. For exam-
ple, at the annual meeting of the Infectious Dis-
eases Society of America, it was reported that the
strain was a potent penicillinase producer, while at
the same time the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) recommended amoxicillin for prophylaxis.
Although there were obvious negative conse-
quences with the anthrax attack, a benefit is that
our eyes were opened. We are now far better
prepared to face a new, and perhaps more serious,
bioterrorism attack. If that were to happen, agents
other than B. anthracis would have to be taken into
consideration. Examples of organisms which are
being considered are Clostridium botulinum (disse-
mination of toxin via water or food), Francisella
tularensis (aerosol dissemination), Yersinia pestis
(aerosol dissemination), and smallpox virus.
Large-scale distribution of any of these organisms
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would require access to rather sophisticated
laboratory facilities. It is unlikely that an indepen-
dent terrorist organization would have access to
such facilities. Such bioterrorism would therefore
have to be state supported, something which today
seems less likely to happen. However, with small-
pox, catastrophic consequences would result from
a single case anywhere in the world. Moreover, if
smallpox virus were available outside the two
designated laboratories at the CDC and in Sver-
dlovsk, it would be relatively easy to infect a few
persons.
What will happen if smallpox is used for bio-
terrorism? Most probably, it will be possible to
contain an epidemic by vaccination of close con-
tacts. However, there is likely to be panic in the
general population, and in developing countries
vaccination campaigns based on tracking of con-
tacts to cases will be next to impossible. Perhaps
the most important factor will be to prevent mass
immunization of the populations. With more than
one-third of the population being unvaccinated
and the rest having received their vaccinations
26 years ago or more, the risk of violent reactions
to smallpox vaccine is obvious. It is therefore of
major importance that research is initiated with the
aim of finding and evaluating new smallpox vac-
cines with less severe side effects. An example of a
possible vaccine candidate is the Ankara strain
(MVA) of vaccinia virus. This strain has been used
for HIV vaccine trials. It has major deletions in the
genome, and it is not known whether it conveys
protection against challenge with a normal vacci-
nia strain; even less is known (for obvious reasons)
about protection against smallpox.
The final, and most important, lesson in this
context is that we need a high degree of coopera-
tion between scientists and between national and
supranational agencies, especially the WHO, if we
want to improve our preparedness. Even if it is
unlikely that we will face an outbreak caused by
smallpox or any other agents, we should be aware
of the fact that we were unprepared for the anthrax
attack. An absolute prerequisite for defending
against a new, and perhaps more severe, attack
is an improved preparedness.
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